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The Owners Phony Proposal Will Not Address Competitive Balance
Abstract
The owners of major league baseball are once again negotiating with the MLB Players Association to
draft a new Collective Bargaining Agreement, as the current agreement expires on December 1, 2021. This
article dissects the opening “pitch” that the owners have recently made to the players at the beginning of
this negotiating process, locating the owner-player battle in the context of how revenue is distributed
within the business of baseball.
This article was originally published in Just Baseball in August of 2021.
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Editor’s Note: This article was originally published in Just Baseball in August of 2021.

The MLB owners want you to believe they are serious about their latest “proposal” to the Players
Association. They reportedly are willing to implement a salary floor requiring all MLB teams to
operate with a minimum $100 million payroll. To get this done, the players would have to accept
luxury taxes imposed on MLB payrolls of $180 million or higher. The owners know that the
players will reject this as an attempt to limit spending by high payroll/high revenue teams. In the
meantime, the owners can claim that they did their best to help promote more “competitive
balance” in major league baseball. Then the owners will proceed with their real agenda: to push
for a revenue plan that will funnel less money to the players and more to the owners.
As an example, consider that the current proposal would tax payrolls above $180 million, while
creating a payroll floor of $100 million. This would in practice tax a combined $259 million of
team payroll over the $180 million figure, while raising payrolls by only $145 million for teams
who are below the $100 million payroll floor (these figures are based on 2021 payrolls at the
start of the season, see Marc Normandin, Baseball Prospectus, August 20, 2021). What this
would mean is top payroll teams would be discouraged from spending more money (a modified
version of a salary cap). Meanwhile the amount of money spent by teams that would be required
to boost their payroll would not increase payrolls by anywhere near the same extent. The bottom
line is that more revenues would go to owners at the expense of players. This would continue the
trend of the past decade as owners have pocketed a rising percentage of MLB revenues.
Many fans will instinctively support this bargaining maneuver by the owners. They will see the
$100 million payroll floor as addressing a serious issue of competitive imbalance. On this point,
the Players Association would agree, as would anyone that has seriously studied payroll
disparities in baseball. In some cases, lower payroll teams are spending less money now than
they were decades ago. As Marc Normandin has recently noted, the Cleveland Indians opening
day roster for this season totaled just under $50 million, compared to $93.4 million in 2001
(Normandin, Baseball Prospectus, August 20, 2021). The stagnation of payrolls among the lower
revenue teams is a problem that needs to be addressed.
However, there are better ways to address this problem than implementing artificial ceilings on
MLB payrolls. The ceilings such as luxury taxes or a more extreme ceiling such as a salary cap
would not necessarily help MLB with its competitive balance issues. In fact, the most
comprehensive academic study just completed, that compares competitive balance across all four
major U.S. sports leagues, concludes that MLB has had the best competitive balance of all the
sports leagues for decades, followed by the NHL (a close second) and the NFL and NBA. The
NFL trails the MLB in aggregate competitive balance measurements despite the NFL’s hard
salary cap, and the NBA is less competitive than MLB despite the league’s soft salary cap (see
Doria and Nalebuff, Sep. 20, 2020, “Measuring Competitive Balance in Sports,” Journal of
Quantitative Analysis in Sports).

In short, MLB’s lack of a salary cap has not made the sport less competitive than others. Still,
there are legitimate concerns about reduced competitiveness in the league, especially given the
propensity of MLB teams to “tank” or to keep their payrolls low for lengthy time periods. The
way to address this problem is by changing the current MLB revenue distribution formula. In the
current collective bargaining agreement, 48% of MLB local revenues are shared among all
teams, with re-distribution of about 6% of local revenues that directly transfer money from
higher to lower revenue clubs. At the margins, this makes a difference. For example, according
to Forbes magazine, the Yankees share approximately 20 percent of their local revenues with
lower revenue/lower market clubs, and teams like Tampa and Miami increase their local
revenues by 50 percent as a result of this re-distribution.
Revenue sharing is necessary in all sports to maintain competitive balance. The best period of
competitive balance in baseball was during the 1980s and early 1990s, when a wider range of
teams competed for the playoffs and there were fewer gaps between the best and the worst teams
in the sport. A key to explaining this period, which I refer to as the “golden age of competitive
balance” in my 2006 book) is the elevated importance of national television contracts during this
time (which were evenly distributed among MLB teams, compared with local sources of
revenues), and the fact that local sources of revenue were more stable then than now (see my
2006 book, Free Agency and Competitive Balance in Baseball, McFarland Press).
After the late 1990s and early 2000s, when local media deals started generating significantly
larger revenue streams for teams in large markets, MLB and the Players Association negotiated
deals to facilitate a distribution of some of this money. And that has helped improve competitive
balance, but it’s not been enough.
For example, while 48% of local revenues are distributed evenly around the league, only about
6% is directly re-distributed from large revenue to small revenue teams. That figure should
increase, so that more money is going to lower-revenue markets. After all, large revenue markets
are generating that revenue by playing in a large market, which restricts the entry of additional
teams to that market. And the only reason large-market teams make that money is because they
play in a league whose success is dependent on a certain level of competitive balance. Here,
courtesy of Fangraphs, is a table documenting the impact of revenue sharing on national and
local revenues of each MLB team, after the 2019 season:

Table 1. – TV Contract Revenue by Team (mil. US$)

* 2016 payment; 2019 payment larger
Source: Fangraphs, taken from Elliott Morss blog, “Major League Baseball Finances: What the Numbers Tell Us,”
November 12, 2019.

As can be seen by this table, the current revenue sharing plan transfers a considerable amount of
local television revenues to lower revenue teams, although it could and should be better. The
table shows the amount of local television money (first column) a team received in 2019 prior to
revenue sharing, then the impact of revenue sharing on that figure (second column), the
distribution of national television revenue to each team (third column) and the final net television
revenue per team (fourth column). Improving upon this existing distribution of local revenues is
the best solution for addressing competitive balance issues. If more money does go to lowrevenue teams, or if a payroll floor is established in the next collective bargaining agreement,
there is no need to connect that to a stricter luxury tax formula, or a soft version of a salary cap
or, worst of all, a real salary cap. These methods of reducing payroll take money out of the
players’ pockets and put it in the owners. This approach does not address competitive balance.
Instead, adjusting the existing distribution of local revenues (as shown above) is the best way to
go. Low payroll teams should be getting disproportionate revenues from high payroll teams.
When revenues are more equally distributed within the sport, competitive balance is greater. But
luxury taxes on high payrolls or salary caps are not necessary for this. Increased percentages of
local revenues distributed from the top teams to the bottom teams is sufficient.
What will not work, however, is continuing a current system that allows lower payroll teams to
pocket the shared local revenues without reinvesting this money into their major league payroll.
There needs to be an enforcement mechanism and an incentive system that ensures that revenue
sharing will be used to increase payrolls, not to tank. This could involve a modest payroll floor,
which could prove very helpful. An even better way to address this is to provide incentives to
lower revenue teams to win more games. This should include rewarding lower revenue teams
that have higher winning percentages by tying revenue distribution to a gradation based on
winning percentages. At the very least, if lower revenue teams want to continue to receive the
same percentage of local revenues from high revenue teams, they should be required to show
improvement over time in winning percentage.
Baseball fans should not be fooled by the owners’ theatrical gestures. The owners are not
providing solutions to competitive balance issues with their latest propaganda masked as a
“proposal.” In fact, baseball has fewer competitive balance problems than we are led to believe.
Competitive balance problems in baseball were far worse in the 1940s, 1950s and early 1960s
before free agency. Competitive balance is actually better now than during these periods that are
often referenced as the “golden age,” which were not so golden for most franchises not named
the Yankees. In addition, as the most sophisticated statistical studies have shown, baseball has
better competitive balance than the other major sports leagues. What the owners are trying to do
is to take money from the players and put it in their pockets. That’s the main objective in
collective bargaining. For me, I would rather more money go to the athletes who play the game.
Competitive balance can be addressed much better and more directly by adjusting the existing
distribution of local revenues, instead of taking money from the players.

